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WAYS OF NOT READING GERTRUDE STEIN
bY NATAlIA cEcIRE
To my wife, who typed three chaotic drafts of manuscript and offered 
endless advice on a subject for which she had no especial relish, the 
book is dedicated.
—colin Manlove, Modern Fantasy: Five Studies
To my wife, who typed the proofs and kept the children quiet, this 
book is affectionately dedicated.
—Francis l. coleman, The Northern 
Rhodesia Copperbelt, 1899-1962 
And again, my wife, who typed every character and every correction 
of every copy from the first to the last page.
—John M. Holmes, Thomas Jefferson Treats Himself: 
Herbs, Physicke, & Nutrition in Early America1
Distant reading is women’s work, and Gertrude Stein shows us why. 
If distant reading is—avowedly—a compromised form of reading, then 
what does it mean to distant read Stein’s The Making of Americans 
(1925), a work that is already reputed to be “unreadable,” as Tanya 
clement does in a 2008 essay?2 Such a move could be viewed as the 
simple application of technology to another difficult problem, another 
tough nut cracked by Progress. I would argue, however, that when we 
situate clement’s approach within the history of ways of not reading 
Gertrude Stein—a history of media, women’s labor, and the status of 
literature—something much broader emerges: how, counterintuitively, 
not reading Stein’s texts can tell us something about them, and can 
tell us something about reading, too.
let us begin, then, with one version of distant reading. In his 2009 
essay “Style, Inc.,” Franco Moretti asks, “How can a couple of words 
stand in for hundreds of pages?”3 To formulate an answer, he analyzes 
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the titles of seven thousand british novels from between 1740 and 
1850 as part of a sociologically inflected literary-historical project that 
he calls “distant reading.”4 “Half sign, half ad,” Moretti writes, “the 
title is where the novel as language meets the novel as commodity.”5 
When Moretti proposes to look at titles, he does so in order to solve 
a problem of unreadability: one cannot possibly meaningfully read the 
seven thousand british novels that he believes warrant our consider-
ation when studying the history of the novel.6 This is a problem of 
scale: unable to read the texts, we opt to read and analyze something 
shorter instead. 
but metonymic phrases can circulate around texts in other ways as 
well. consider, for instance, “pigeons on the grass alas,” “there’s no 
there there,” or “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.”7 Such phrases have 
long served as signifiers of Stein’s whole oeuvre, often deracinated 
from their specific sources. Rather than indicating a plot, setting, or 
genre, as Moretti’s titles do, phrases like “rose is a rose is a rose is 
a rose” represent a recognizable Steinian style that was both utterly 
distinctive and endlessly imitable and imitated—the style that has 
been so widely identified (judged, deprecated, defended, celebrated) 
as “unreadable.”8 Stein’s is a different kind of unreadability: although 
she was indeed terribly prolific, it is not scale but rather something 
about her style that is an impediment to reading; not the how much 
but simply the how.
Yet Stein’s unreadability has something to teach us about the unread-
ability of Moretti’s corpus, too, for beneath the problem of scale lurks 
a problem of style. Part of the reason these seven thousand british 
novels cannot be read is that the vast majority of them have not been 
canonized, which is in the aggregate, if not in every particular case, 
a matter of style: avowedly or not, hardly anyone now actually wants 
to read these books, much less seven thousand of them—they’re too 
generic; too, perhaps, boring. Indeed, it is the premise that these 
novels are generic and stylistically unremarkable that lends Moretti’s 
claims their weight: he argues that a trend toward short, abstract titles 
like Patience and Moderation constituted a “perceptual shift” that 
“made readers look for a unity in the narrative structure” of novels. 
“And mediocre conservative writers,” Moretti concludes, “did more to 
make it happen than anyone else.”9 As his title, “Style, Inc.,” suggests, 
scale itself is revealed as generative of style. The historical upshot thus 
extracted, the procedure of attentively not reading these novels makes 
a persuasive case for continuing not to read them.10 
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Not reading is of course the only logical way to handle something 
unreadable, which is why Moretti has elsewhere enjoined critics to 
“learn how not to read.”11 Yet the problem of Steinian style discloses a 
reciprocal problem of scale, insofar as the hallmark of Stein’s stylistic 
unreadability—repetition—mimics the repetitive quality of reading 
stylistically unremarkable books in quantity. In both cases, the question 
of whether reading would be “worth it” is up for debate, revealing that 
the status of not reading depends crucially on a question that is always 
pressing for literary critics: whether and under what circumstances 
reading counts as work.12 
The last few years have seen increased critical interest in nonreading 
and compromised forms of reading, including a notion of “surface 
reading” inspired in part by Moretti’s research.13 concomitantly, 
conceptual writers such as Kenneth Goldsmith, Vanessa Place, and 
Rob Fitterman have achieved prominence with a plagiarism-oriented 
“uncreative writing” that “negates the need for reading in the traditional 
textual sense.”14 Not-reading seems to be very much of the moment. 
Yet the very possibility of Moretti not reading those seven thousand 
british novels but having something useful to say about them all the 
same is predicated on the work of a historical moment—roughly, 
Stein’s moment—in which the possibility of machinic, outsourced, or 
otherwise cognitively displaced reading was a site of intense investiga-
tion in industry, the arts, and media. Thus, while work by Moretti and 
others has recently used machines to challenge the status of reading 
in literary criticism, Stein has been challenging the status of reading 
for a hundred years.15 
The relationship between not reading and the unreadable, then, is 
not simply a matter of logic (unreadable texts should be not-read), but 
rather embedded in an early twentieth-century history of compromised 
reading, whether performed by machines or by women. That history, 
moreover, everywhere marks the reception of Stein’s writing precisely 
on the grounds of her unreadable style. Stein’s repetitive, “unreadable” 
style, I wish to argue, points up a history of female labor that not only 
evokes but literally made possible the machine-aided nonreading 
practices of recent decades. clement’s 2008 distant reading of The 
Making of Americans uses algorithmic methods explicitly modeled 
on Moretti’s—methods notionally developed to address a problem of 
scale—in order to address Stein’s different, stylistic unreadability, what 
clement glosses as the widespread critical sense that Stein’s “constant 
repetition represents a style of writing that is chaotic, unsystematic, 
and virtually impossible to read” (“T,” 362). In effecting this redirection 
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toward stylistic unreadability, clement’s distant reading reveals the 
reciprocal relationship between scale and style in which both Stein’s 
reception and distant reading are implicated. consequently, rather than 
merely applying an autonomous method to yet another corpus, clement 
encounters Stein’s writing on its own terms and brings those terms 
to bear on contemporary distant reading. And in order to understand 
the significance of clement’s intervention, we must first examine the 
historical terms of Stein’s unreadability.
I. “STEINESE”
Edmund Wilson, in his influential 1931 monograph Axel’s Castle, 
became one of the earliest and most prominent critics to declare 
Stein “unreadable,” principally on the basis of her use of repetition. 
“I confess that I have not read [The Making of Americans] all the way 
through,” he writes, “and I do not know whether it is possible to do 
so.”16 Stein’s unreadable style has been taken as evidence of her genius 
and of fraud in equal measure. Indeed, it has been praised as innova-
tive and condemned as nonsense on exactly the same formal grounds: 
a simple vocabulary, the elevation of sound-sense above semantic 
sense, and above all, repetition. As Jennifer Ashton has noted, “[w]hen 
juxtaposed with the more recent celebratory accounts . . . the early, 
dismissive accounts of Stein become especially useful as markers in 
an extended critical tradition, if only because they are so consistent 
with their later counterparts in the stylistic features they single out as 
evidence of Stein’s fundamental unintelligibility.”17 In the 1935 Fred 
Astaire film Top Hat, for example, Stein serves as a humorous pop 
culture reference when an Italian dressmaker, beddini (Erik Rhodes), 
reads Ginger Rogers’s character, Dale, a hard-to-read message in the 
form of a telegram: “come ahead stop stop being a sap stop you can 
even bring Alberto stop my husband is stopping at your hotel stop 
when do you start stop.” Poor beddini confesses, “I cannot understand 
who wrote this,” and Dale returns, “Sounds like Gertrude Stein.”18 
To “sound like Gertrude Stein” is, as the joke in Top Hat suggests, 
to be self-evidently impossible to parse. Yet the conditions of that self-
evidence are important. As I will suggest below, it is no accident that 
what makes Dale’s telegram sound like Gertrude Stein is the repetition 
of the word “stop,” which indicates that the telegram is a telegram, 
composed expressly to be mediated by unseen telegraph workers, likely 
women.19 The joke in Top Hat turns on the alleged ease of confusing 
Stein’s style with the unwilled repetitions produced by telegraphy. 
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The joke from Top Hat also demonstrates another important condi-
tion of Stein’s unreadability: that it is best illustrated through metonymic 
samples of Stein’s writing, especially the phrase that Stein would 
embrace as an official signifier of her style: “rose is a rose is a rose 
is a rose.” The popular circulation of this phrase in lieu of sustained 
readings of Stein’s texts is one form of nonreading (you read it in lieu 
of reading whole works by Stein), anticipating the more sophisticated 
meta-analysis that Moretti will later perform on the titles of british 
novels. Stein has always been not-read. More importantly, perhaps, 
Stein’s embrace of this circulation reveals her stylistic disposition toward 
compromised reading practices: Stein has also always been not-read-
able. This unreadability, then, is not so much an absence as an active 
feature of Stein’s writing and reception. Moreover, that unreadability 
has a history that will bear on how we understand clement’s distant 
reading of The Making of Americans. The repetition and circulation 
of “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” continually reenacts a concern 
with compromised linguistic practices that its source, the 1922 poem 
“Sacred Emily,” locates in a form of work whose status as work is 
compromised in advance: the work of wives.20
before elaborating on its connection to the work of wives, I wish 
to specify what I see as the most important ways that that repetition 
and circulation operated. During Stein’s lifetime and since, “rose is a 
rose is a rose is a rose” has functioned powerfully as a self-sufficient 
signifier of both Stein’s writing in general and her unreadable style in 
particular; one 1935 article even tautologically names Stein’s style “her 
‘a rose is a rose is a rose’ style.”21 Indeed, the phrase was used almost 
talismanically to counter any suggestion that Stein might be readable 
after all. The Time magazine book review “Stein’s Way,” a review of 
The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, for example, confesses that 
“The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas is a perfectly comprehensible, 
eminently readable memoir”—but only after rehearsing at length 
Stein’s reputation for stylistic opacity.22 Indeed, the review suggests, we 
might never believe that the readable Autobiography was written by 
the unreadable Stein were it not for “the circular motto on the book’s 
cover—a signature . . . peculiar to Gertrude Stein.”23 The review then 
reproduces the circular “rose is a rose is a rose” motto that elsewhere 
decorated Stein’s dishware, various gifts, and an Ascher scarf designed 
by Sir Francis Rose.24 Although the style of the memoir’s text is 
uncommonly accessible, and although the metonym for that text that 
Moretti might examine (the title) may mislead readers into supposing 
that its author is Alice, the circular motto lets us know that there is 
286 Ways of not Reading Gertrude Stein
something fundamental about the Autobiography that still makes it 
what contemporaries, playing on the alienness then associated with 
chinese languages, called “Steinese,” and that Stein is really unread-
able no matter what evidence the Autobiography might provide to 
the contrary.25 The phrase “rose is a rose is a rose,” really a logo here, 
rehabilitates the readable Autobiography and brings it under the sign 
of Stein’s unreadable style.
The proliferation of “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” then, simul-
taneously signifies Stein’s unreadability and instantiates the practice of 
not-reading her texts. Indeed, one of the bancroft library’s first-edition 
copies of the volume in which it first appeared, Geography and Plays, 
now widely available through the nonprofit Internet Archive, bears a 
handwritten mark next to “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” as if to 
suggest that the main reason to read the poem “Sacred Emily” might 
be to look at the famous line.26 Yet the poem seems to anticipate this 
reading (or rather, nonreading), I would suggest.
“Sacred Emily” opens thus:
compose compose beds.
Wives of great men rest tranquil. 
come go stay philip philip.
Egg be takers.
Parts of place nuts.
Suppose twenty for cent.
It is rose in hen. 
come one day.
A firm terrible a firm terrible hindering, a firm hindering 
 have a ray nor pin nor.
Egg in place.
Egg in few insists. 
In set a place.
I am not missing.
Who is a permit.
I love honor and obey I do love honor and obey I do.
Melancholy do lip sing.
How old is he.
Murmur pet murmur pet murmur.
Push sea push sea push sea push sea push sea push sea 
push sea push sea.
Sweet and good and kind to all.27
This opening reveals that “Sacred Emily” is a poem of oikonomia, one 
interested in particular in the household management undertaken by 
the “wives of great men.”28 It is, in other words, about a particular kind 
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of work, the repetitive work in the home that is often construed as 
non-work. The poem begins with an imperative to “compose,” a “Sing, 
muse!” that is quickly deflated into the making of beds (“compose 
compose beds”) and then into a busy, interwoven tapestry of household 
noises, of eggs and place settings, of the saying of marriage vows and the 
minding of children. Repeatedly recurring to the idea of placement—
“come go stay”; “Egg in place”; “In set a place”— household manage-
ment is indeed revealed as continually requiring acts of composition, 
casting irony on the second line’s assertion that “Wives of great men 
rest tranquil.” Such wives are constantly composing the materials and 
people around them, and in so doing compose poems like “Sacred 
Emily”; thus the opening imperative to compose poetry is fulfilled in 
the course of composing beds, place settings, and the like. Does this 
make the wife of a great man great herself? This is unclear: around the 
middle of the poem, Stein writes, “So great so great Emily. / Sew grate 
sew grate Emily.”29 Homophony turns praise of Emily’s greatness into 
an incantation of repetitive household drudgery, the repeated motions 
of sewing alternating with the repeated motions of grating and the /o/ 
and /e/ sounds relentlessly oscillating, both—after the homophonous 
“so great” line—sounding as if they have been going on a long time. 
Hints of wifely greatness dissolve in repetitive housework. The wives 
of great men thus compose, but are also themselves composed by, the 
poems—like “Sacred Emily”—that literally circumscribe their worlds.30 
The theme of the wives of great men is one that Stein would take up 
again in the book that secured her celebrity and came sealed with the 
circular “rose is a rose is a rose” motto, The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas. Stein uses her life partner’s voice as a medium for composing 
the memoir, and while it is quite clearly Stein’s memoir—that of a self-
proclaimed “genius”—the book’s title and running conceit centralize 
Alice, the wife of the “great man,” as the one deserving of an auto-
biography. The Alice character in the Autobiography self-consciously 
posits the memoir as a substitute for the book she always thought she 
would write—one about the wives of geniuses she has known, at once 
holding out the possibility of wife-as-author and marking her own 
status as the wife of a genius: 
before I decided to write this book my twenty-five years with Gertrude 
Stein, I had often said that I would write, The wives of geniuses I have 
sat with. I have sat with so many. I have sat with wives who were not 
wives, of geniuses who were real geniuses. I have sat with real wives of 
geniuses who were not real geniuses. I have sat with wives of geniuses, 
of near geniuses, of would be geniuses, in short I have sat very often 
and very long with many wives and wives of many geniuses. (A, 671) 
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The Alice of the Autobiography extends the premise of a book about 
her own wifehood (“my twenty-five years with Gertrude Stein”) and 
proposes it as a substitute for another book about wives of great men, 
“The wives of geniuses I have sat with.” Since she will in a moment start 
discussing Fernande, the on-and-off partner of official genius Pablo 
Picasso, the Alice character in effect proposes “the wives of geniuses” 
as a reading of the Autobiography.31 Just as Stein’s life and work are 
offered through the medium of Alice’s voice, many of the stories about 
the visitors at 27, rue de Fleurus will be mediated through stories 
about their partners. The founding conceit that the Autobiography is 
Alice’s is more than a funny trick (although it is that too): the wife is a 
medium, but a necessary medium. Indeed, in combinatorially pairing 
different degrees of wifehood with different degrees of genius, the voice 
of the Alice composed by Stein is revealed as very much a medium: it 
is one of the many moments where the Autobiography is marked by 
Stein’s distinctively repeating, permuting “‘a rose is a rose is a rose’ 
style.” In the Autobiography, as in “Sacred Emily,” authorial voice is 
always somehow traceable back to the “genius” of Stein’s celebrity 
persona. Yet that style, I wish to suggest, itself formalizes (or, perhaps, 
appropriates) the wifely labor of “Sacred Emily,” insofar as it invites 
its own reception as compromised and “unreadable.” Stein thus makes 
literary composition functionally indistinguishable from oikonomia.
II. STEIN’S cORPUS
Stein’s appropriation of a wife’s voice is of course as problematic as it 
is provocative: the very act of pointing to Alice stylistically points right 
back to Gertrude. Yet we should also take seriously the ways in which 
Alice’s disappearance is thematized, for the very propensity of wifely 
labor to disappear or be credited to someone else, I would argue, is 
the basis of Stein’s stylistic unreadability. The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas insists on Alice’s role as a medium and a facilitator, present 
but always receding. Thus the first edition self-consciously plays on 
the author’s identity, with the Harcourt brace dust jacket proclaiming 
that “Since the first announcement of the forthcoming publication 
of this book, innumerable questions have been asked about Alice b. 
Toklas. Who is this author? What is this extraordinary book that she has 
written? Does she really exist?”32 Moreover, correspondence between 
Stein’s agent William bradley and the Atlantic editor Ellery Sedgwick 
further reveals that Stein at first desired to publish excerpts of the 
Autobiography in The Atlantic Monthly unsigned, as if by Alice. Over 
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a series of telegrams and letters, Sedgwick firmly denied the request 
on the grounds that it would render the material “unintelligible to our 
readers. Imperative that we use name.”33 “Rose is a rose is a rose is a 
rose,” which the Time review identifies as the mark of Stein’s author-
ship, thus renders the Autobiography intelligible by tethering it to 
Stein’s by-definition-unintelligible style. Or, to put it another way, the 
project of the Autobiography is only intelligible through an ostentatious 
substitution of Stein’s voice for the fictive Alice’s. Stein’s unreadability 
lies in the disappearing act of wifely labor, in the slippage between “so 
great” and “sew grate.” As I will argue in the next section, this is, too, 
the disappearing act that underwrites distant reading. 
One of the most fundamental bases of Stein’s unreadability, then, 
is corporeal. Stein’s texts invoke female labor—forms of labor that are 
a priori understood to be bodily and compromised, and which cannot 
be seen or read. In doing so, those texts invite their own identification 
with bodies, which must be approached in ways other than reading: 
testing, sampling, diagnosis. As we have seen, for example, the style 
of “Sacred Emily” is paratactic and repetitive, drawing on a domestic, 
largely monosyllabic and bisyllabic lexicon. Familiar phrases are evoked 
sonically without being named outright, like the “if you insist” suggested 
by “in few insists,” the “eggbeaters” suggested by “egg be takers,” or 
the “placemats” suggested by “place nuts.” With its repetition, its logic 
of sonic resemblance, and its difficulty supplied by syntactic rather 
than lexical cues, it is fairly typical of the unreadable style associated 
with Stein and emblematized by its famous excerpt, “Rose is a rose 
is a rose is a rose.”
Wilson would describe this style as Stein’s “soporific rigmaroles, 
her echolaliac incantations, her half-witted-sounding catalogues of 
numbers.”34 It is, of course, no accident that Wilson’s description is 
pathologizing: “soporific,” “echolaliac,” “half-witted.” Reading Stein is 
represented as a physical impossibility, such that Wilson must substitute 
diagnosis as a strategy of engagement. Indeed, the diagnostic gesture 
of selecting arbitrary samples of Stein’s style, much as I did with the 
passage from “Sacred Emily” above, and as has been done even more 
widely with the line “Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” is typical of 
a reception history that has always understood Stein’s writing as an 
emanation of her body.35 Wilson is explicit in describing Stein’s unread-
ability in terms of bodiliness; he continues, as if by way of concession:
Yet, remembering especially her early work, we are still aware of 
her presence in the background of contemporary literature—and we 
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picture her as the great pyramidal buddha of Jo Davidson’s statue of 
her, eternally and placidly ruminating the gradual developments of 
the processes of being, registering the vibrations of a psychological 
country like some august human seismograph whose charts we haven’t 
the training to read.36
As Wilson frames it, the reading of Stein (for which we “haven’t the 
training” in any case) is substitutable by the image of her body—a 
fat body, Wilson unsubtly points out—whose very thought processes 
are interpreted as “rumination”—literally a form of digestion. Nor 
is Wilson alone in this interpretation; indeed, there is a small but 
choice class of medical articles on Stein’s writing, the most famous 
being the behaviorist b. F. Skinner’s Atlantic article “Has Gertrude 
Stein a Secret?,” to which I will return below. In the British Medical 
Journal, W. langdon brown, Regius Professor of Physic at cambridge 
University, singled Stein out as a “notorious” practitioner of what he 
calls “the ‘cocky-locky, henny-penny’ style of writing,” writing that, 
he argues, is obviously “fishe[d] up from the unconscious,” a produc-
tion of the body unshaped by intellect.37 And a 1934 editorial in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) went so far as 
to diagnose Stein with “palilalia,” “a form of speech disorder in which 
the patient repeats many times a word, a phrase or a sentence which 
he has just spoken.”38 
Such accounts approach the problem of Stein’s unreadability by 
imagining a scene of writing whose pathology explains the output. 
While the medical literature is often openly hostile to Stein’s claims 
as an artist (Skinner is, interestingly, an exception), the projection of 
an imaginary scene of writing is a strategy that has been undertaken 
even by notionally sympathetic projects, such as Janet Malcolm’s 2007 
double biography of Stein and Toklas. In it, Malcolm avers in an oddly 
disapproving tone that Stein’s “literary enterprise was itself almost 
entirely work-free. . . . Stein didn’t even type her work; she just oozed 
into her notebooks and Toklas did the rest.”39 Here, typing is set up 
as kind of marginal or minimal labor, but Stein’s writing, as Malcolm 
describes it, is not “even” that; it’s something closer to excretion. The 
pathological scene of writing is bodily but not medicalized; instead, 
Stein’s corporeal “ooz[ing]” is a failure to work. As catharine Stimpson 
argued in an important intervention, to designate a work “unread-
able” is often to strangely implicate the work with the author’s body. 
“Inevitably,” Stimpson writes, “detractors of Stein’s body conflate her 
mind and body. They then disdain and fear her work. They seek to 
neutralize the threat that her potent combination of nature and culture 
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offers: the body that she lived in; the family religion she more or less 
abandoned; the writing she never abandoned.”40 As Stimpson argues, 
Stein’s body—fat, female, lesbian, and Jewish—is conventionally seen 
as the source of her (unreadable, not worth reading) writing. 
For Stimpson writing in the 1980s, this bears on Stein’s canonicity; 
in that moment of feminist recovery, Stein’s writing was perhaps at risk 
of becoming like Moretti’s seven thousand british novels: unreadable, 
unread. This was an important project in part because the recovery 
of female writing as writing was a critical and political counterpart to 
the recovery of female labor as labor, as in Arlie Russell Hochschild’s 
pointedly titled 1989 sociological study The Second Shift. Women in 
the workforce, Hochschild documented, continued to perform most 
domestic labor in addition to their paid labor outside the home, 
thus taking on a “second shift” of unshared and unpaid work in the 
home.41 As the Wages for Housework movement of the 1970s stipu-
lated, “the difference with housework [as opposed to waged work] 
lies in the fact that not only has it been imposed on women, but it 
has been transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique 
and personality, an internal need, an aspiration, supposedly coming 
from the depth of our female character.”42 The feminist project of 
literary recovery, of which the Stein boom of the 1980s was a part, is 
also a project of remuneration, of giving “value” back to the female 
labor that has been unfairly considered not-valuable.43 Just as female 
labor, especially when repetitive, domestic, or reproductive, was prone 
to being naturalized and thereby rendered invisible, female writing 
was prone to being described as a mere emanation of the body and 
erased from the literary canon.44 To be sure, Stein’s own purposes are 
unknown and must especially be distinguished from uses to which her 
literary persona and texts have been marshaled, both by the feminist 
recovery projects of the 1980s and by me. Stein was famously unin-
terested in political feminism, and her writing, in important contrast 
to much 1980s criticism, seems less interested in “recovery” than in 
the moment of effacement.45 Yet her texts consistently engaged the 
deeply gendered question of whose reading and writing counts as 
real work, which, as I will argue below, always powerfully informs the 
history of digital reading.
Since that critical moment, and thanks to scholars like Stimpson, 
Stein seems in no danger of falling into obscurity, and it therefore seems 
less important to defend against the disdain and fear that Stimpson is so 
concerned to isolate. Yet even as dismissal and mockery have given way 
to valorization and canonical security, at least in academic discourse, a 
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trope of unreadability rooted in bodiliness has remained and, I would 
argue, reaches its logical conclusion in clement’s very sympathetic 2008 
distant reading. In particular, the unreadability trope conventionally 
projects out from Stein’s texts imagined scenes of reading (undertaken 
by an inevitably baffled and often physically stricken reader) and 
writing (undertaken by a fictive Stein). Stein’s “unreadability” is typi-
cally understood as a formal property of her texts, detectable solely 
through the experience of an imagined reader, and signifying the scene 
of writing imagined to be its cause. Or rather, unreadability is not so 
much a particular formal property as a style, what Wilson specifies are 
“sentences so regularly rhythmical, so needlessly prolix, so many times 
repeated and ending so often in present participles.” by this description, 
“Steinese” is a consistent quality that can be sampled arbitrarily (any 
given chunk of it will do to make the point) and that always produces 
the same result—in Wilson’s estimation, that “the reader is all too soon 
in a state . . . simply to fall asleep.”46 As clement summarizes with 
respect to The Making of Americans, “critics agree that the reader’s 
usual processes of making meaning through narrative are rendered 
useless.”47 “The reader” invoked here is of course a hypothetical or 
fictive one, but one who keeps reappearing and sits at the center of 
numerous critical accounts of Stein’s writing. Susan Mccabe notes 
how Stein’s repetition “calls for supreme attention by the reader”; 
Priscilla Wald writes that “nearly one thousand pages of unremitting 
wordplay [in The Making of Americans] leave most readers longing 
for a story.”48 Meanwhile, Richard bridgman sympathetically opens 
his important 1970 monograph on Stein with another fictive account 
of reading: “Reading Gertrude Stein at length is not unlike making 
one’s way through an interminable and badly printed game book.”49 It 
is as if Stein’s texts compel the ghostly projection of bodies engaged 
in frustrated or failed acts of reading and writing. In bob Perelman’s 
words, there are moments when Stein’s words are “something Stein is 
telling me: there is no literary distance involved.”50 Text nearly evapo-
rates in the presence of a conjured Stein and her conjured readers.51
With so many imaginary bodies at play in imaginary scenes of reading 
and writing, the readings that sample Stein’s language as if it were a 
homogeneous substance, too abundant to examine comprehensively 
but possible to treat metonymically, are deeply textual in comparison. 
Yet this, too, is a strategy for bypassing the impossible demands of 
reading Stein; passages are excerpted to show that Stein’s writing is 
like this; it is not there to be read but to exemplify. “For those who are 
unfamiliar with the writing of Miss Stein, we mention the following 
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examples from the book called ‘Tender buttons,’” writes the same 
JAMA editorialist who diagnoses Stein with palilalia.52 Similarly, the 
1933 Time reviewer writes, “If [readers] are sufficiently curious to look 
up some of her wilder work, this is the kind of thing they may find.”53 
An arbitrary chunk of Stein’s writing is sufficient to illustrate the “kind 
of thing” that’s meant, and knowing the “kind of thing” is as good as 
knowing the thing.54 Such treatments establish a tight loop between 
the unreadable text and the nonreading of that text: the unreadable 
text precludes reading, while the conventions of nonreading (diagnosis, 
sampling, viewing) produce the text as unreadable—indeed, as, in a 
certain sense, not text. like the body itself, Stein’s writing cannot be 
read, only sampled, tested, anatomized, and diagnosed—treated quite 
literally like a corpus.55 
I am arguing, in other words, that the persistence of this trope in 
Stein criticism—well into Stein’s canonical security—suggests that 
unreadability is more just than a sexist excuse to ignore her.56 If a 
fictional confused reader continually reappears in Stein criticism, and 
if critics constantly invent ways to engage with Stein that circumvent 
the act of reading, then perhaps such projected scenes of failed reading 
and writing are genuinely important features of Stein’s texts. I would 
suggest that Stein courts the charge of unreadability with a form of 
writing that is, as Malcolm’s disapproving account registers, not work, 
or that is at least only ambiguously work. Stein’s writing conjures up 
its own scene of composition as bodily, nonlaborious, naturalized or 
mechanized, even digestive or excretory—not thereby recuperating 
such phenomena as “productive,” but rather travestying the very terms 
of production. 
Malcolm’s image of Stein’s wrongly- or under-Taylorized, word-
oozing body has its antecedents, of course, in Stein’s own archive, with 
a specificity that reveals how tightly Stein’s unreadability is tethered 
to machine-age discourses of automation. In a now much-studied 
1896 Psychological Review article titled “Normal Motor Automatism,” 
Stein and her collaborator, William James’s graduate student leon 
Solomons, sought to induce automatic writing in what they called 
“normal subjects,” who were in fact themselves. (That is to say, they 
were their own experimental subjects.) In contrast with the model of 
automatic writing associated with surrealism, which attempts to access 
a psychoanalytic unconscious, Solomons and Stein set out to disprove 
a reigning theory that the symptoms of hysteria are evidence of what 
they term a “second personality.” They do this by attempting to show 
what the body of a “normal” subject can accomplish without the 
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participation of consciousness.57 Automatic behaviors, they argue, are 
latent in all human bodies, and hysteria, far from being the result of a 
“second personality” asserting itself, is merely a defect in willpower or 
“disease of the attention”; there is, in other words, only one personality, 
a conscious personality, but in the case of the hysteric, it is a weak one 
that fails to control the body’s natural automatic behaviors.58 “[M]any 
of the acts which we usually do quite consciously,” Solomons and Stein 
assert, “might really be done without consciousness.”59 
The principal behavior that Solomons and Stein choose as a test 
case—the behavior that might plausibly be the product of a second 
personality, that seems to demand conscious participation, and that 
therefore ought to demolish the theory of second personality if found 
to be producible “automatically” in normal, non-hysterical subjects—is 
of course writing. Since Stein is known principally as a writer, accounts 
of her psychology papers have typically taken this choice of test case 
(that is, writing) as a matter of course, and indeed the choice goes 
unremarked and undefended in “Normal Motor Automatism.” but the 
choice is really rather notable, since it sets writing up as an activity so 
quintessentially conscious as to stand in for the whole alleged “second 
personality.”60 The consequence of this choice over the course of 
the study is, of course, to render writing an artifact of the body and, 
indeed, something sensed by the body before cognized by the mind: in 
one experiment, “[s]ometimes the writing of the word was completely 
unconscious, but more often the subject knew what was going on. His 
knowledge, however, was obtained by sensations from the arm. He was 
conscious that he just had written a word, not that he was about to do 
so.”61 Solomons and Stein can demolish the “second personality” only 
by demolishing the assumed causal link between authorial personality 
and writing. They thus produce a body that is simultaneously automatic 
and potentially capable of producing art works. 
These experiments would become the basis for the most notorious 
pathologization of Stein’s writing, Skinner’s 1934 Atlantic Monthly 
article “Has Gertrude Stein a Secret?” Skinner argued that Stein’s 
unreadable writings were produced by the forms of automatism under 
scrutiny in these experiments, making them (to his mind) essentially 
nonwriting. In proposing these experiments as the “secret” of Stein’s 
unreadability, Skinner strips Stein of her role as experimental scientist, 
and recasts her solely as an experimental subject. (That is to say, the fact 
that she is formally investigating these phenomena disappears, leaving 
behind only an experimented-upon automatic writer.)62 Skinner thus 
renders Stein’s body a double disqualification from authorship: first, she 
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is not really the author of works like Tender Buttons and The Making 
of Americans because they are written by her body, and second, Stein 
is not really the co-author of this study, since it is only relevant as an 
explanation for her later publications. This would seem to be a clear 
instance of female intellectual labor being naturalized, located in the 
body, and rendered as nonwork in just the way that Stimpson points 
out. For that reason, Skinner’s assessment has been much repudiated 
by Stein’s admirers.63 but Stein’s own response, given in a letter to 
Sedgwick, the Atlantic editor, was curiously more ambiguous: “it is not 
so automatic as he thinks.”64 As I have argued elsewhere, there are 
any number of reasons to question the explanatory value of “Normal 
Motor Automatism” for Stein’s later writing, not least of them Stein’s 
own revisionary accounts of the project in Everybody’s Autobiography 
and in interviews and letters.65 Yet the consonance between Solomons 
and Stein’s word-producing bodies and those continually offered up 
by critical accounts of Stein’s writing—hostile and sympathetic alike—
suggest that, whatever the motives behind the searches for explanatory 
scenes of compromised, overly embodied reading and writing, they 
are scenes that interested Stein too. 
III. THE SEcOND SHIFT
Stein thus seems to invite the identification of her writing with a 
body, and not a laboring body so much as a body functioning auto-
matically—machinically or naturally, but at any rate not consciously. 
As Solomons wrote of one experiment with Stein, “The first thing to 
disappear is the feeling of effort. . . . The writing seems perfectly volun-
tary, but there is no sense of difficulty, of ‘something accomplished.’”66 
Stein’s unreadability is thus founded on imagined scenes of reading 
and composition whose status as work is compromised or denied. And 
if it is not work, the reasoning goes, then it may not be a linguistic act 
at all; the mind absent, the body serves as a mere passive conduit for 
words—a medium or a “Steinese room.”67 
We are by now some way toward understanding how Stein’s unread-
ability anticipates the conditions of distant reading, for this historical, 
gendered, and ambiguously laboring body has played a crucial role in 
the history of media and information. “A medium is a medium is a 
medium,” the media theorist Friedrich Kittler quips, playing on Stein’s 
most quoted line in order to insist on the interchangeability of female-
operated media technologies and the female mediums of nineteenth-
century occultism.68 And indeed, the female typewriter, computer, 
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telephone operator, telegraphist, and programmer that emerged in 
the early twentieth century are particularly notable for their notional 
ability to serve as conduits of information without altering it or being 
themselves altered by it; as Jennifer Fleissner writes of the incessantly 
typing Mina in bram Stoker’s Dracula, “This is, then, a different sort 
of female body: one that can receive marks . . . without being branded 
for life . . . . a body that permits good bourgeois women to safely enter, 
and to exit, the men’s corporate realm.”69 Female information workers 
at the turn of the twentieth century enact a reading that is not reading 
and a writing that is not writing.
The new role of the female information worker rested in part on 
a long-standing (and still persisting) suspicion that women are bad 
readers—especially when they are reading voraciously. Feminine-coded 
and woman-targeted mass market novels simultaneously keep the 
publishing industry afloat and, in the aggregate, are continually at risk 
of becoming the equivalent of Moretti’s seven thousand noncanonical 
british novels.70 What is interesting about the stereotype is not so much 
the imputed badness itself or the sexism on which it relies, but rather 
the form that the badness takes: women read too much; they read 
things that are not worth reading; they are unseeing and indiscrimi-
nate. This stereotype has persisted alongside a wide diversity of real 
women’s reading practices, and in spite of the ways in which so-called 
women’s genres often explicitly lampoon and contest the construction 
of their readerships as undiscerning and merely escapist.71 The rapt 
female reader is thus imagined as an automaton, not so much reading 
as scanning, taking in words in enormous quantity without the will or 
critical acuity to “master” them. And in return, the literature destined 
for her “consumption” is equally automatic in quality: formulaic, repeti-
tive, predictable.72 It is as automata that the female writer and female 
reader alike are imagined as ideally suited for information work.73 
It is in this context that Kittler argues that the typewriter “inverts 
the gender of writing,” rendering it feminine.74 Famously, female 
typists took on an occupational title identical to the name of the 
machine they operated (that is, the typewriter). christopher Keep has 
suggested that the typewriter was “domesticate[d]” through compari-
sons to other, conventionally “feminine” machines like the piano and 
the sewing machine in advertising and in typewriting manuals.75 Such 
comparisons suggest women’s domestically trained suitedness for this 
labor, projecting domestic forms of labor into the corporate workplace: 
“the type-writer is especially adapted to feminine fingers,” one manual 
averred; “The type-writing involves no hard labor, and no more skill 
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than playing the piano.”76 This identification with the machine and 
the denial of her work as “hard labor” renders the typist an apparatus 
herself, rhythmically and repetitively moving her fingers as she serves 
as an unmarked conduit for another’s words.
These characterizations are familiar, but they are important for 
understanding how closely the gendering of early twentieth-century 
information work maps onto the gendering of reproductive labor of the 
kind famously described by Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own: 
“all the dinners are cooked; the plates and cups washed; the children 
sent to school and gone out into the world. Nothing remains of it all. All 
has vanished.”77 Repetition, the form that characterizes Stein’s “unread-
ability,” describes the motions of the female domestic worker as easily 
as it describes the Taylorized factory worker—“sew grate sew grate,” 
as Stein puts it in “Sacred Emily.”78 The female information worker is 
neither, yet kin to both: through its cultural figuration as an extension 
of the domestic and through its formal qualities as both repetitive and 
literally reproductive (of another’s words), information work, though 
often paid, overlapped significantly with unwaged domestic labor, and 
indeed, for the many wives who typed their husbands’ manuscripts, 
such work was a form of unwaged domestic labor.
I have quoted dedications to a few such wives as epigraphs to this 
essay, but few dedications to the typing “wives of great men” have 
subsumed the entire work, as in the case of The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas. Stein’s memoir is, in a way, all dedication to the typing 
wife, a thorough centralization of the wife of the great man, even as 
Alice’s ventriloquized voice serves as a medium for narrating Stein’s life 
and career. The fictionalized Alice, moreover, emerges as a virtuosic 
reader of Stein’s works precisely through her typing, in a passage that 
clement adopts as the epigraph for her first distant reading article: 
“I always say that you cannot tell what a picture really is or what an 
object really is until you dust it every day and you cannot tell what 
a book is until you type it or proofread it. It then does something to 
you that only reading can never do” (A, 776; “T,” 361). The compro-
mised information work of typing and proofreading take on a status 
that exceeds “only reading.” Moreover, Stein explicitly identifies the 
unremunerated information work of typing and proofreading with 
the mundane domestic labor of dusting, the repetitive, tactile task 
of fending off a layer of grime that will always return tomorrow, no 
matter how thoroughly one cleans today. Stein thus characterizes the 
ideal nonreading of typing and proofreading as, like “Sacred Emily,” 
a matter of oikonomia, and “[t]he wives of great men rest tranquil” 
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by definition, even as they “compose.” In the case of the real Toklas, 
whose second shift included typing most of Stein’s writings, including 
The Making of Americans, that composition was quite material—and, 
Stein suggests, better than reading. Stein’s ideal reader, it would seem, 
is something very like a machine. 
It is with this history in mind, I would suggest, that we should 
understand clement’s distant reading of The Making of Americans, 
first published in Literary and Linguistic Computing in 2008 and 
reframed for a less technical audience in Texas Studies in Literature 
and Language in 2012. There, clement uses algorithmic methods to 
detect, map, and visualize repetitions with variations in The Making 
of Americans, deliberately literalizing the machinic (non)reading that 
Stein everywhere provokes, and placing the nonreading of Stein in 
direct contact with Moretti’s inquiries into methods for engaging 
unreadable corpora. clement borrows the term “distant reading” 
from Moretti, citing his injunction to “learn how not to read” texts 
(“T,” 361). The baffled reader of world literature for whom Moretti’s 
distant reading methods are a solution is implicitly kin to the baffled 
reader of Stein, and of the insistent repetitions of her long opus The 
Making of Americans in particular. “[I]s the confusion the repetition 
engenders a byproduct of reading meant to deconstruct processes of 
identity construction by making meaning through methods that ulti-
mately elude meaning-making?,” clement asks.79 “Or, alternatively, is 
the confusion the repetition engenders the result of a misreading and 
simply a byproduct of our inability to read the text?” (“T,” 361-62).
The importance of clement’s contribution, I would argue, lies in 
its challenge to reading, a challenge that has special significance in 
the context of Stein’s reception. Importantly, clement never disputes 
that Stein’s repetitive style engenders confusion or that “we” (the 
hypothetical reader again) are ill-equipped to read it. Reading Stein 
at all, clement proposes, is “misreading,” even if, or perhaps because, 
that confusion is as tightly determined by the texts as critical tradition 
has suggested. Yet clement also proposes a corrective for the reading-
that-is-always-misreading, a machine reader—a nonreader—that is not 
confused. “I will use a critical reading with digital methodologies,” 
she writes in the 2012 essay, “to show how Stein combines narra-
tive (story and plot) from the first half of the text with nonnarrative 
elements (such as accumulated, repetitive grammatical structures) in 
the second half of the text to create a mimetic experience of history in 
the making.”80 crucially, given that it can only be accessed via “digital 
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methodologies,” this is a “mimetic experience of history” that no one is 
having. Or rather, it is an experience that no human reader is having.
It would not be accurate, of course, to suppose that the clement’s 
method consists simply of feeding a text into a machine; human analysis 
is crucial to the process. It is not so much that nothing is being read by 
a human as that The Making of Americans must first be translated, via 
frequent pattern analysis algorithms and co-occurrence visualizations, 
into several data sets that are themselves readable by humans in a way 
that the novel is not. clement reconstitutes a problem of style—the 
repetition that characterizes Stein’s “‘a rose is a rose is a rose’ style”—as 
a problem of scale, to which counting and graphing are a good solu-
tion. Thus the nonreading that clement performs here is a translation 
or remediation that “does something that only reading can never do.”
“It was over a thousand pages long and I was typewriting it,” the 
fictionalized Alice says of The Making of Americans, thus emerging once 
again as Stein’s best nonreader (A, 776). And indeed, the Autobiography 
stages the legible copying of images and texts as recurring work crises; 
thus, after Stein’s Three Lives is completed, the problem emerges: 
“And then it had to be typewritten” (A, 712). Where composition itself 
seems to present no particular challenge, typing is something that 
Stein simply cannot do: “Gertrude Stein tried to copy Three lives on 
the typewriter but it was no use, it made her nervous, so Etta cone 
came to the rescue” (A, 713). The scene of delegated labor mirrors 
a story of childhood authorship that is narrated soon after, about a 
school assignment for which the young Gertrude writes a description 
of a sunset: “[I]t was one of the half dozen in the school chosen to be 
copied out on beautiful parchment paper. After she had tried to copy 
it twice and the writing became worse and worse she was reduced to 
letting some one else copy it for her” (A, 736–37). Though in each 
case she “trie[s],” the Gertrude Stein of the Autobiography is unable 
to copy—or rather, unable to copy legibly. “[H]er handwriting has 
always been illegible,” the fictional Alice writes, “and I am very often 
able to read it when she is not” (A, 737). What comes out of Stein is 
literally unreadable, that is, illegible, until transmuted by her typists. 
Touching, dusting, merely (so to speak) processing, allowing the text 
to pass through the fingertips: these modes brook no bewilderment, 
and are not the scene of “misreading” that clement’s work seeks to 
correct—rather, they are the scene that the distant reading restages.
clement’s distant reading thus meets Stein’s particular, historical 
unreadability on its own ground, in part, I would suggest, because 
computational methods and contemporary information work came from 
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that ground. As is now fairly common knowledge, the first “computers” 
were young women who performed computations for engineering 
and research, and early programming—physical programming, which 
was effected by the resetting of switches and wired circuits—was 
conventionally done by women, only becoming a masculinized profes-
sion after automatic programming was introduced.81 computing was, 
in other words, a specialized subset of the early twentieth century’s 
landscape of information work, the technoculture that eventually 
makes it possible to do a literally machinic reading of The Making of 
Americans. but as Wendy Hui Kyong chun has observed, there is a 
deep ambivalence in this gendered history. To delegate programming 
the computer to women was to delegate responsibility and knowledge 
as well as to delegate what was often very tedious and repetitive labor.82 
Early, physical programming could well be seen as drudgery much like 
housework; indeed, the first “bug” in computer code was famously a 
moth that disrupted the physical functioning of the machine, so that 
“debugging” was literally cleaning. Thus the development of so-called 
automatic programming or “pseudocode”—what we now simply call 
“programming”—empowers the programmer to imagine her or his 
word as logos, something like a form of authorship that, in speaking, 
makes things happen. but as chun emphasizes, programming can only 
function as logos at the price of knowledge of the physical operations 
that underlie it.83 The merely repetitive labor of physical programming 
is made into a black box; we ask the computer to do laborious cognitive 
tasks on our behalf, and this is both empowering and disempowering, 
sacrificing one form of knowledge in the service of another.
These gestures parallel the models of not reading that continu-
ally crop up in Stein’s reception: Stein’s typing-as-reading and the 
outsourcing of reading to various people’s wives re-enacts the black-
boxing of routine and repeated processes common to the information 
work that was conventionally gendered feminine during the machine 
age. And there is certainly something routine about the reading of 
Stein’s repetitive texts; in some passages it is efficient to look not for 
repeated words but for new ones, the difference that makes a differ-
ence; this is what makes Stein’s writing so amenable to sampling and 
diagnosis. In computing, as chun notes, “there is no difference between 
access to and understanding of the record, between what would be 
called, perhaps symptomatically, ‘machine reading’ and human reading 
and comprehension. . . . The difficulty supposedly lies in selecting the 
data, not in reading it, for it is assumed that reading is a trivial act, a 
simple comprehension of the record’s content.”84 In the world of the 
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machine, seeing is reading. considered in this light, clement’s distant 
reading reveals how The Making of Americans operates as the kind of 
text for which such a radical model of reading could be apt.
IV. NONREADING AND UNWAGED WORK
What kind of work is reading? And what kind of work is reading 
Stein? I have so far outlined a variety of ways that Stein’s texts have 
been reconstituted as scenes of reading and composition described 
in the terms of feminine-gendered, compromised work or nonwork: 
the scene of “automatic writing,” the diagnoses of mental or physical 
pathology, the bafflement of imagined readers, and the necessity of 
an algorithm that can read on critics’ behalf. Proxy bodies that are all 
body, their cognitive processes shut down or nonexistent in the first 
place, are continually conjured as shields against the text—interpre-
tive lenses that are completely opaque, functioning by obviating the 
possibility of interpretation altogether.85 This reception has one further 
feature that I wish to unfold, namely a moralization of work and, in 
particular, a recurring language of fraud or economic unfairness—the 
accusations, in short, that Stein, and anyone taking her writing seri-
ously, is a charlatan, perpetrating what the JAMA editorialist calls a 
“hoax.”86 “[I]s she ‘kidding’ her readers or is her stuff just ‘nerts’?”87 
The compromised status of Stein’s and readers’ labor undergirds 
the accusation of charlatanism; thus bridgman fends off the threat 
of Skinner’s diagnosis of “automatic writing” by pointing to Stein’s 
“arduous” development as a writer, an insistence that she was working 
hard after all.88 And the alternate explanation of Stein’s unreadability 
holds that she is not impossible to read, but rather “difficult.” One 
must be willing to put in the work.89 “clearly, reading The Making of 
Americans is difficult work,” clement writes (“T,” 362). but does that 
work “pay off”? Not really, clement’s project suggests—not so well, in 
any case, that we aren’t better served by automating it. The history of 
not reading Stein is a history of recognizing the potential unfavorability 
of the economic exchange on offer, your time and attention for Stein’s 
writing, all guarantees withheld. We know in advance that the reading 
will be repetitive, lengthy, and thin on narrative progression, much like 
housework and potentially as unrewarded—so great so great, sew grate 
sew grate. What is so unsettling is how resolutely Stein seems to resist 
defending her writerly legitimacy in the terms of deliberate, waged or 
wage-eligible work. Even the alternative to the charge of automatic 
writing that she offers remains in the register of the mechanical: “if 
anything it is xtra consciousness”—as if cranking up a dial.90
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More recently, Helga lénárt-cheng has argued that repetition 
in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas serves as a manipulative 
advertising ploy, “a powerful means to influence the audience’s 
opinion about [Stein] herself.”91 lénárt-cheng’s reproach is implicit 
but clear: repetition’s subtle persuasiveness renders the audience 
unable to evaluate Stein’s oeuvre accurately—an audience imagined 
as susceptible, subliminally worked upon by repetition and thus prac-
ticed upon (that is, deceived). “conscious of the powerful influence 
of repetition,” lénárt-cheng writes, “Stein actually carried out her 
own self-promoting advertising campaign under the guise of character 
development.”92 Though I do not share lénárt-cheng’s indignation, I 
believe that she has a point when she flags the congruences between 
the repetitions of Stein’s continuous present and the repetitions of 
advertising—between antiwork and work that might be construed as 
quite venal, even economically fraudulent. As Sara blair has elaborated 
with respect to the salon at 27, rue de Fleurus, avant-garde forma-
tions are coextensive with and at times productive of commercialized 
domestic spaces, participating in a “cultural work” that continually 
challenges the distinction between “domestic” and “public” arenas.93
blair’s thesis is borne out in the way that “rose is a rose is a rose is 
a rose” serves as the metonymic sign of Stein’s unreadability, its logo-
like function remaking readable prose (the Autobiography, or Stein’s 
1939 children’s book The World Is Round) over as unreadable poetry.94 
Stein famously explained after one of her chicago lectures: “Now 
listen! I’m no fool. I know that in daily life we don’t go around saying 
‘. . . is a . . . is a . . . is a . . .’ Yes, I’m no fool; but I think that in that 
line the rose is red for the first time in English poetry for a hundred 
years.”95 We can certainly read Stein’s signature phrase as avant-gardist 
defamiliarization of the word “rose.” Yet its relentless propagation also 
reinforces the suspicion that careful reading might not be “worth it”: 
Speaking of the device of rose is a rose is a rose is a rose, it was I 
who found it in one of Gertrude Stein’s manuscripts and insisted 
upon putting it as a device on the letter paper, on the table linen and 
anywhere that she would permit that I would put it. I am very pleased 
with myself for having done so. (A, 798-99) 
The Autobiography’s Alice cites “one of Gertrude Stein’s manuscripts” 
as if ostentatiously uninterested in understanding its source, “Sacred 
Emily,” as an integral work; selecting this piece of handwritten text, she 
not only transcribes it once but, like a photocopier run amok, causes it 
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to be reproduced all over the household furnishings. Stein represents 
a wife’s bad reading, the reproduction of text, and good housekeeping 
as conspiring to produce the virulently propagating commercial success 
that is her own perpetually suspect persona. “Rose is a rose is a rose 
is a rose” is avant-garde and kitsch—that’s the worry.96
Stein’s poetics engages the public and the market, then, by central-
izing feminized, typically unwaged labor, especially repetitive labor 
including housework and information work. This is a poetics effected 
not only in the texts “themselves” but also in the scenes of compromised 
reading and writing that they continually propose, and in the propaga-
tion of phrases like “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” and “pigeons on 
the grass alas” that stand in for such scenes of compromised reading 
and writing—that is, for Stein’s unreadability—as much as they stand 
in for any other aspect of the texts. The suspicion of fraudulence or 
theft has something to do with the impression of remunerating (with 
cultural prestige, with attention) the by-definition wage-ineligible 
labor of a wife—and more than that, the labor of the wife of a great 
man, where the great man is a woman. Will Fisher has argued that 
counterfeiting and economic fraud have long been closely associated 
with sexual queerness, as in the term “queer money” for counterfeit 
currency; since the early modern period, he writes, “unnatural sexu-
alities and unnatural economics were coded through each other.”97 
Putting Alice in plain sight and making her labors the explicit medium 
of Stein’s unreadability foregrounds the unease with which we credit 
certain kinds of work. “Has Gertrude Stein a secret? The answer is 
of course ‘yes’ and by the way, it’s not about sex,” Mark Goble writes, 
except that Stein’s past as a research subject (for it is in that capacity, 
not as a researcher, that Skinner describes her) is a past of inhabiting 
the wifely, repetitive role of the information worker, and is in that 
sense exactly about sex—and gender too.98
The perpetual question of whether it “pays” to read Stein’s unread-
able writing anticipates contemporary disciplinary questions about 
whether “distant readings” like Moretti’s or clement’s constitute 
“worthwhile” scholarship.99 In a response to Moretti’s “Style, Inc.,” 
for instance, Katie Trumpener suggests that there are alternative 
responses to the problem of scale posed by Moretti’s seven thousand 
british novels. “[T]here is obviously a labor-intensive way to find 
answers,” Trumpener writes, “by . . . reading individual manuscript 
drafts in rare book libraries . . . . Such investigation would involve 
real footwork—and probably more commitment to specific novels 
than Moretti would want to make.”100 In his own response, Moretti 
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points to the model of labor imagined here. After quoting Trumpener, 
he adds, “Real work, not like databases.”101 If a little unfair about the 
specifics, Moretti is perceptive about the stakes: Trumpener suggests 
that analyzing a database of titles instead of reading books erroneously 
reinterprets of the problem of too many books as a problem of too 
much work—or rather, and more insidiously, a problem of too much 
of the wrong kind of work. In other words, while not reading is the 
only possible response to what is unreadable, designating a corpus 
“unreadable” always amounts to a judgment about the kind of labor 
that would go into reading it: a suggestion that that reading would be 
drudgery, a kind of worthless work, unrewarding or unremunerable or 
both. Is the only alternative to a canonical literary history of “so great 
so great” a literary history of “sew grate sew grate”?
Stein’s unreadability discloses that the relationship between scale and 
style—between quantity and quality—is always a negotiation of value, 
one that continues to play out in the nonreading of distant reading. 
Stein aggressively, self-aggrandizingly insists on her own importance 
while refusing to affirm that her writing is “work” in the sense of being 
“wage-eligible,” instead continually aligning her writing with housework 
and with information work and (maddeningly, to many contemporaries) 
meeting with her greatest commercial success by posing as a typist’s 
amanuensis, effecting an authorial chiasmus and masquerading as her 
own lesbian wife.102 Stein’s unreadability, then, is always ready to risk 
(and receive) the charges of “fraud” or “hoax”; it insists on the value of 
repetitive labors without presupposing that that value must come on 
capital’s gendered terms (as wage-eligible “hard work”). Not reading 
Stein, as clement does, is a historical act, one that responds to the 
compromised status of reading itself. “Why don’t you write the way 
you talk?” a reporter once asked Stein, to which she replied, “Why 
don’t you read the way I write?”103
Why not, indeed? 
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